Tag Archives: DNS

MTA-STS Support in Exchange 2019 and Exchange Online

My previous blogpost was about DANE and discussed how DANE can be used to make TLS negotiations between mailservers more secure. Another topic in this area is MTA-STS. MTA-STS stands for Message Transfer Server – Strict Transport Security and MTA-STS is a mechanism to enforce the use of TLS and the use of a valid 3rd party server certificate.

MTA-STS, DNS and Policies

When an MTA-STS capable servers wants to send an email, it first retrieves the MX record for the recipient domain. The second step is that the sending server check for an MTA-STS record in DNS. This record looks like:

_mta-sts.exchangelabs.nl. IN TXT "v=STSv1; id=202306242147;"

The id is an identifier and defines the version of the MTA-STS record when changes are made to the MTA-STS record. A good practice is to create an identifier based on the date and time of the last change. In this example, it is June 24, 2023 at 9:47pm.

The next step is that the sending servers looks for a policy. This policy is not stored in DNS, but on a website. The URL for this policy looks like: https://mta-sts.exchangelabs.nl/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. The subdomain mta-sts, the filename mta-sts.txt and the directory .well-known (including the dot) directory are mandatory for the MTA-STS policy. It must also be secured using a valid 3rd party server certificate.

The MTA-STS policy will look something like:

version: STSv1
mode: enforce
mx: smtphost.exchangelabs.nl
mx: *.mail.protection.outlook.com
max_age: 604800

Note. If you have configured DANE for inbound email in Exchange Online, your MX record should be something like Exchangelabs-nl.y-v1.mx.microsoft.

The MTA-STS policy is structured as follows:

  • Version identifies the version of MTA-STS but must always be STSv1 (for now at least).
  • Mode defines how the policy must be applied:
    • Enforce: Sending MTAs MUST NOT deliver the message to hosts that fail MX matching or certificate validation or that do not support STARTTLS.
    • Testing: Sending MTAs that also implement the TLSRPT (TLS Reporting) specification [RFC8460] send a report indicating policy application failures (as long as TLSRPT is also implemented by the recipient domain); in any case, messages maybe delivered as though there were no MTA-STS validation failure.
    • None: In this mode, Sending MTAs should treat the Policy Domain as though it does not have any active policy.
  • MX defines all MX records in use by the recipient domain. This can be one entry, but it can hold multiple MX records, each on a separate line as shown in the policy above.
  • Max_age defines the time (in seconds) that the MTA-STS policy can be cached by a mail server. In this example, the policy is cached for 604800 seconds, which equals to 1 week. When a sending server must send a new email within a week, the policy is still cached. After checking the MX record the server retrieves the TXT record from DNS (as explained in the second step above) and when the identifier has not changed it uses the policy that is cached. If the identifies has changed within the lifetime of the cached policy, a new policy is downloaded.

So, in my example an MTA-STS capable mail server will check the MTA-STS policy and only connects to my mail server using TLS 1.2 (this is enforced with MTA-STS when mode is set to ‘enforce’) and only when a certificate that matches the FQDN is used. When authentication fails for an entry, the sending server continues with the next line in the policy, in my example with the MX record pointing to Exchange Online.

An interesting option in MTA-STS is reporting. DMARC has a reporting function as well, but reports are only sent by receiving domains. Reporting in MTA-STS is performed daily by sending mail servers that supports MTA-STS and TLS-RPT.

To configure the reporting functionality, create a mailbox in Exchange 2019 or Exchange Online and assign it an email address like TLSReports@Exchangelabs.nl. The next step is to configure the following DNS TXT record:

_smtp._tls.exchangelabs.nl. 3600 IN  TXT v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:TLSReports@exchangelabs.nl

There are several online tools available for checking the MTS-STS record. Just like in my other blogs, I often use MXToolbox to check for DNS records as shown in the following screenshot:

As with the DANE checks, the mailhardener site (https://www.mailhardener.com/tools/mta-sts-validator) can also be used to check MTA-STS records as shown in the following screenshot:

When you check the IIS logs of the webserver where the mta-sts.txt file is stored, you can see which servers are using MTA-STS:

2023-07-11 08:29:59 172.16.1.4 GET /.well-known/mta-sts.txt - 443 - 74.125.217.68 Google-SMTP-STS - 200 0 0 119
2023-07-11 13:54:51 172.16.1.4 GET /.well-known/mta-sts.txt - 443 - 104.47.11.254 - - 200 0 0 62
2023-07-11 14:13:37 172.16.1.4 GET /.well-known/mta-sts.txt - 443 - 77.238.178.114 AHC/2.1 - 200 0 0 20

The first one is obvious, the second line is a Microsoft IP address, the third line is a Yahoo IP address. So, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo are using MTA-STS when sending email.

MTA-STS versus DANE

MTA-STS and DANE share a common concept, that is to secure the (initial) communication between mail servers. The ‘problem’ with DANE is that is relies on DNSSEC and the global roll-out of DNSSEC is very slow (to put it mildly).

MTA-STS was developed to overcome the slow roll-out of DNSSEC (since it does not use DNSSEC of course). MTA-STS can be seen as a ‘light-weight’ version of DANE and it will be sufficient for most customers.

And how about Exchange?

Just like with DANE, the ugly part is that Exchange 2019 does not support MTA-STS. You can configure the MTA-STS record in DNS and the policy on a website so that MTA-STS capable servers use your Exchange 2019 server safely. But for sent messages by Exchange 2019, MTA-STS is a no-go, it does not support it and most likely will never do.

Exchange Online on the other hand does support MTA-STS (since the beginning of 2022) for both inbound and outbound messages. The only thing you must do to enable it for inbound messages is create the TXT record in DNS and create and publish the MTA-STS policy.

Edited on July 11, 2023

DKIM record in WordPress DNS

So, today I found out that outbound mail from my jaapwesselius.com did not have a DKIM signature (after mail was blocked by prodigy.net). I have my jaapwesselius.com running on WordPress.com. To do this, WordPress requires to have DNS hosted with them. No problem, but adding a DKIM record in WordPress DNS is not possible, it fails with a TXT records may not exceed 255 characters error message as shown below:

The solution is relatively simple. You can add a CNAME record for the original DKIM record. For example, have safemail._domainkey.jaapwesselius.com point to something like safemailhop.exchangelabs.nl (I own that domain too, and DNS is hosted at my provider Argeweb).

CNAME: safemail._domainkey.jaapwesselius.com safemailhop.exchangelabs.nl

Create a new TXT record safemailhop.exchangelabs.nl and add the original DKIM record (from my jaapwesselius.com domain) to it et voila, that’s it.

Check with https://mxtoolbox.com/dkim.aspx reveals that it works:

And some header information:

Note. Yes I know, p=NONE in the DMARC record could (should/must) be changed to quarantine or even REJECT, but I’m still in development 😊

SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Exchange Online Protection

In the previous two blog posts I’ve explained how to implement Exchange Online Protection as a message hygiene solution for your on-premises Exchange environment, both for inbound as well as outbound mail flow.

In this blog post I’ll go more into detail when configuring Exchange Online Protection

SPF, DKIM and DMARC

When Exchange Online Protection is fully up-and-running you can continue configuring SPF, DKIM and DMARC for message authentication purposes. This will make sure your email domain is much harder to spoof and receiving email systems know that the source of your email is a trusted source.

SPF

SPF has been around for years, and in my previous blog post I already mentioned the SPF record needed for use with Exchange Online Protection. If you want to read more about implementing SPF, please check my SenderID, SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Exchange 2016 – Part I blog post.

When only using Exchange Online Protection your SPF record will look like v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all.

DKIM

The good thing about Exchange Online Protection is that it supports DKIM signing and verification out of the box. The only thing you have to do is enable it in the Exchange Admin Center!

Logon to the Exchange (Online Protection) Admin Center, select protection in the navigation menu and click DKIM in the toolbar. When you click enable, an error message (in yellow) is shown that you need to create the appropriate DNS records first (click to enlarge).

EOP-DKIM

The error message reads (for search engine purposes):
CNAME record does not exist for this config. Please publish the following two CNAME records first.
selector1-domain-com._domainkey.tenantname.onmicrosoft.com
selector2-domain-com._domainkey.tenantname.onmicrosoft.com

The description isn’t that clear when you’re not a DKIM guru, but you need to create the following CNAME records:

Selector1._domainkey.domain.com CNAME selector1-domain-com._domainkey.tenant.onmicrosoft.com
Selector2._domainkey.domain.com CNAME selector2-domain-com._domainkey.tenant.onmicrosoft.com

When the DNS records are created you can use the MXToolbox to check if they are valid:MXToolbox-DKIM

If an email is sent from the on-premises Exchange server via Exchange Online Protection to for example Gmail, you can check the headers. If configured correctly you can see the SPF check passes, you can see the DKIM signature created by EOP and you can see the authentication results as well. It should read spf=pass and dkim=pass under Authentication Results as shown in the following screenshot (click to enlarge):

EOP-DKIM-Signed

For more information regarding DKIM and Exchange, please check my SenderID, SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Exchange 2016 – Part II blogpost.

DMARC

When DKIM and SPF are configured correctly you can create a DMARC record in public DNS. A DMARC policy will tell a receiving mail server what to do with email that does not comply with other settings. For example, if email is coming from a mail server that’s not listed in the SPF record it might well be spoofed. If the DKIM signature is missing it might be spoofed, if the DKIM signature is not valid, the message might be tempered with. If this is the case, you can define a policy that will reject such a message. The DNS record will be like this:

v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;pct=100;rua=mailto:dmarcreports@exchange2019.nl

The RUA is an email address where DMARC reports are sent to, so it’s a good thing to have such a mailbox on your Exchange server.

When sending an email from the Exchange server via EOP to Gmail when SPF, DKIM and DMARC are configured, you can see information like the following screenshot in the email headers (click to enlarge):

EOP-DKIM-Signed-DMARC

Everything is configured correctly now and spoofing is much harder to achieve for malicious users.

For more information regarding DMARC and Exchange, please check my SenderID, SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Exchange 2016 – Part III blog post.

Summary

In this blogpost I showed you how to configure SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Exchange Online Protection to prevent spoofing by malicious users.
In my next blog I’ll go more into detail about configuring the message hygiene options themselves in Exchange Online Protection.

SenderID, SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Exchange 2016 – Part III

In the previous two blog posts I have discussed SPF and DKIM as a way of validating the authenticity of email messages. SPF is using an SPF record in public DNS where all legitimate outbound SMTP servers for a domain are listed. A receiving SMTP server can check this DNS record to make sure the sending mail server is allowed to send email messages on behalf of the user or his organization.

DKIM is about signing and verifying header information in email messages. A sending mail server can digitally sign messages, using a private key that’s only available to the sending mail server. The receiving mail server checks the public key in DNS to verify the signed information in the email message. Since the private key is only available to the sending organization’s mail servers, the receiving mail server knows that it’s a legitimate mail server, and thus a legitimate email message.

As a reminder, my test environment is configured as follows:

image

There’s an Exchange 2016 CU2 Mailbox server hosting several Mailboxes, and there’s an Exchange 2016 CU2 Edge Transport server. Using Edge Synchronization all inbound and outbound SMTP traffic is handled by the Edge Transport server.

In the previous two blog posts an SPF record was created and implemented, and DKIM including a DKIM signing module on the Edge Transport server was implemented and functioning correctly.

This last blog in a series of three discusses DMARC, which is built on top of SPF and DKIM. Continue reading SenderID, SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Exchange 2016 – Part III

SenderID, SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Exchange 2016 – Part II

In the previous blogpost I have been discussing how SPF works and how it uses public DNS to validate the authenticity of the sending SMTP servers. When SPF is implemented correctly a receiving mail server can validate is the sending mail server is allowed to send email on behalf of the sender or his organization.

In this blogpost I will discuss DKIM signing as an additional (and more complicated, and more difficult to spoof) step in email validation.

As a quick reminder, here’s how my lab environment looks like:

image

There’s an Exchange 2016 CU2 Mailbox server hosting several Mailboxes, and there’s an Exchange 2016 CU2 Edge Transport server. An Edge synchronization will make sure that all inbound and outbound SMTP traffic is handled by the Edge Transport server.

In my previous blogpost an SPF record was created and implemented with the following value:

v=spf1 a:smtphost.exchangelabs.nl ~all

so receiving mail servers can validate that my Edge Transport server is allowed to send email on my behalf, and when mail is originating from another mail server it might well be a spoofed message.

But for now let’s continue with DKIM. Continue reading SenderID, SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Exchange 2016 – Part II